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ARGUMENT 
While the defendants attempt to distinguish the present case from Dalley v. 
Utah Valley Regional Med. Ctr.. 791 P.2d 193 (Utah 1990), any such effort is doomed 
by the Court's express holding in that case. 
Where a plaintiff receives an injury to a healthy 
part of the body not involved in the operation in 
an operating room controlled by known 
defendants, res ipsa loquitur establishes a 
rebuttable inference of negligence and causation 
that puts the burden of going forward with the 
evidence upon those persons who were awake, 
aware, and conscious at the time of the injury, 
who were responsible for the plaintiff's safety at a 
time when he or she was not in a position to 
assume that responsibility. Res ipsa loquitur 
infers causation, and therefore a material issue of 
fact exists that must be presented to the trier of 
fact. If plaintiff prefers to rest upon the inference 
of cause established by res ipsa loquitur, then that 
is a tactical decision that should not be short-
circuited by summary judgment. 
791 P.2d at 200 (emphasis added). 
Under the clear holding of Dalley. Mr. Baczuk has established all that he 
need to to require that his case be submitted to the jury. The defendants' suggestion to 
the contrary flies in the face of the Court's own words. 
Furthermore, the assertion that res ipsa loquitur doesn't apply because 
defendants' offered affidavits giving the opinion that there was no breach of the 
standard of care is at odds with Dalley. The Court there said that the need for reliance 
on res ipsa could be eliminated if someone who was present during the operation comes 
1 
forward and offers "a conclusive exculpatory statement or explanation of how the 
injury occurred . . .". 791 P.2d at 200. That has not happened in this case. Neither 
of the defendants1 affidavits, submitted by individuals who were not present during the 
operation, even opines as to the specific cause of Mr. Baczuk's injury or what the 
nature of his injury is. The sum of the defendants1 evidence can be simply paraphrased 
as "these things happen". 
In point of fact, had plaintiff's case not been short-circuited for want of 
expert testimony on the standard of care, he would have produced evidence that his 
injury was most likely a burn and that such a burn can only occur from being subjected 
to a K-pad which is functioning improperly. Dr. Saffle has rendered the opinion that 
Mr. Baczuk's injury was most probably a burn because it was located in the 
entertriginous fold of the gluteus which would be resistant to pressure sore development 
and because it was uniformly partial thickness in nature, whereas pressure sores are 
almost always full thickness. 
Further evidence would have demonstrated that only temperatures over 
110° F. will cause skin burns and that K-pads operating properly will not achieve this 
temperature, suggesting that Mr. Baczuk was exposed to a malfunctioning 
instrumentality under the control of the hospital. 
Even if it is assumed the injury was a pressure necrosis, evidence 
Mr. Baczuk was denied the opportunity to present, would establish that the K-pad 
manufacturer expressly warns health care providers that when using the pad, 
2 
temperature and skin condition should be monitored every 20 minutes and additional 
surveillance is required if the pad is used under pressure (from the body) to prevent 
ischemic, which is the cause of pressure necrosis. 
Accordingly, whichever form of injury Mr. Baczuk suffered, it was caused 
by the defendants' conduct. As his injury is of the type the Supreme Court has held to 
raise an inference of negligence and causation, his case should have been allowed to 
proceed to trial where that inference could have been bolstered by the additional 
evidence referred to above. This evidence could also be considered by the jury in 
evaluating the defendants' claim that "these things happen" in the absence of 
negligence. In that regard, the jury will be able to evaluate Dr. Saffle's opinion, relied 
on by defendants, in light of the fact that it was rendered after Dr. Moench wrote to 
him threatening legal action for his expression of a prior opinion. 
Despite the defendants' suggestion to the contrary, King v. Searle 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858 (Utah 1992), in no way undercuts the holding in 
Dalley. In King, the Court simply held that where a plaintiff sues two different basis 
for the liability of each, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not shift the burden of 
production to the defendants on the causation question because the defendants were not 
jointly responsible for the "exclusive management or control of all possible causation 
factors . . .". 832 P.2d at 866. That is simply not the case in this action. In addition, 
defendants' attempted reliance on Hunt v. Hurst. 785 P.2d 414 (Utah 1990) is 
misplaced. In that case, the Court held that the plaintiff had failed to show that his 
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injuries were of a type generally only suffered as a result of negligence, therefore 
failing to meet the proof required to establish the first element of res ipsa loquitur. 
However, later that same year, the Court clearly articulated one type of injury which 
definitively does satisfy the first element of res ipsa loquitur. [w]here a plaintiff 
receives an injury to a healthy part of the body not involved in the operation [while] in 
an operating room . . .". Dalley at 200. 
As it is undisputed that Mr. Baczuk suffered such an injury, that is the end of 
the inquiry regarding the first element of res ipsa. While the defendants (and their 
witnesses) may disagree with the propriety of the Supreme Court1 s holding on this 
point, such disagreement is of no moment. Our Supreme Court has simply rejected the 
notion that health care providers can avoid having their negligence determined by a jury 
in those cases where a patient goes into surgery for a problem with one part of his body 
and comes out with a permanent injury to another. 
When it is remembered that the requirements for expert testimony in medical 
malpractice cases was born of court's concerns that the practice of medicine often 
involves complex scientific issues beyond the experiences of lay jurors, it can be seen 
why no such testimony is necessary in this case. Mr. Baczuk was either burned 
unintentionally or suffered significant death of tissue from loss of its blood supply by 
being placed on a device for nine hours, a device from which such loss of blood flow is 
a known consequence about which its manufacturer expressly warns. A jury can fairly 
decide this matter without knowing how to practice medicine, and the defendants can 
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offer their evidence as to why they believe either or both of these results are not 
indicative of negligence. Under the law of this State as articulated by our Supreme 
Court, Mr. Baczuk is entitled to have the jury decide the issues in this case, and the 
defendants will have every opportunity to try to convince them that "these things 
happen" even in the absence of neglect. But when what happens is an injury to the 
patient at a location remote from the site of his surgery, that is all he need establish to 
place the issue of negligence into the hands of the jury. Though the health care 
defendants might believe more should be required, the law does not. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that a patient who demonstrates 
that he suffered an injury to one part of his body while undergoing an operation upon 
another can rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to permit his claim to be 
submitted to the trier of fact. The ruling of the court below in this matter to the 
contrary should be reversed, and the matter remanded for a jury trial on the merits. 
DATED this ^ day of April, 2000. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
M. David Eckersley^/ 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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